Chapter 24

Estimating Causal Effects from Observations

Chapter 23 gave us ways of identifying causal effects, that is, of knowing when quantities like \( \Pr(Y = y|do(X = x)) \) are functions of the distribution of observable variables. Once we know that something is identifiable, the next question is how we can actually estimate it from data.

24.1 Estimators in the Back- and Front- Door Criteria

The back-door and front-door criteria for identification not only show us when causal effects are identifiable, they actually give us formulas for representing the causal effects in terms of ordinary conditional probabilities. When \( S \) satisfies the back-door criterion, for instance,

\[
\Pr(Y = y|do(X = x)) = \sum_s \Pr(S = s)\Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s)
\]  

(24.1)

Everything on the right-hand side refers to the distribution of observables, following the usual DAG without any surgery.

This is very handy, because we have spent the whole first part of the class learning different ways of estimating distributions like \( \Pr(S = s) \) and \( \Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s) \). We can do fully non-parametric density estimation (Chapter 15), we can use parametric density models, we can model \( Y|X, S = f(X, S) + \epsilon \), and use regression, etc. If \( \hat{\Pr}(Y = y|X = x, S = s) \) is a consistent estimator of \( \Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s) \), and \( \hat{\Pr}(S = s) \) is a consistent estimator of \( \Pr(S = s) \), then

\[
\sum_s \hat{\Pr}(S = s)\hat{\Pr}(Y = y|X = x, S = s)
\]  

(24.2)

will be a consistent estimator of \( \Pr(Y|do(X = x)) \).
24.1. ESTIMATORS IN THE BACK- AND FRONT-DOOR CRITERIA

In principle, I could end this section right here, but there are some special cases and tricks which are worth knowing about. For simplicity, I will in this section only work with the back-door criterion, since estimating with the front-door criterion amounts to doing two rounds of back-door adjustment.

### 24.1.1 Estimating Average Causal Effects

Because \( \Pr(Y|do(X = x)) \) is a probability distribution, one can ask about \( \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = x)] \), when it makes sense for \( Y \) to have an expectation value:

\[
\mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = x)] = \sum_{y} y \Pr(Y = y|do(X = x))
\]

(24.3)

as you’d hope. This is the average effect, or sometimes just the effect of \( do(X = x) \). While it is certainly not always the case that it summarizes all there is to know about the effect of \( X \) on \( Y \), it is often useful.

If we identify the effect of \( X \) on \( Y \) through the back-door criterion, with control variables \( S \), then some algebra shows

\[
\mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = x)] = \sum_{y} y \Pr(Y = y|do(X = x))
\]

(24.4)

\[
= \sum_{y} y \sum_{s} \Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s) \Pr(S = s)
\]

(24.5)

\[
= \sum_{s} \Pr(S = s) \sum_{y} y \Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s)
\]

(24.6)

\[
= \sum_{s} \Pr(S = s) \mathbb{E}[Y|X = x, S = s]
\]

(24.7)

The inner conditional expectation is just the regression function, for when we try to make a point-prediction of \( Y \) from \( X \) and \( S \), so now all of the regression methods from Part I come into play. We would, however, still need to know the distribution \( \Pr(S) \), so as to average appropriately. Let’s turn to this.

### 24.1.2 Avoiding Estimating Marginal Distributions

We’ll continue to focus on estimating the causal effect of \( X \) on \( Y \) using the back-door criterion, i.e., assuming we’ve found a set of control variables \( S \) such that

\[
\Pr(Y = y|do(X = x)) = \sum_{s} \Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s) \Pr(S = s)
\]

(24.8)

\( S \) will generally contain multiple variables, so we are committed to estimating two potentially quite high-dimensional distributions, \( \Pr(S) \) and \( \Pr(Y|X, S) \). Even assuming that we knew all the distributions, just enumerating possible values \( s \) and summing over them would be computationally demanding. (Similarly, if \( S \) is continuous, we would need to do a high-dimensional integral.) Can we reduce these burdens?

One useful short-cut is to use the law of large numbers, rather than exhaustively enumerating all possible values of \( s \). Notice that the left-hand side fixes \( y \) and \( x \),
so \( \Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s) \) is just some function of \( s \). If we have an IID sample of realizations of \( S \), say \( s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n \), then the law of large numbers says that, for all well-behaved function \( f \),

\[
\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(s_i) \to \sum_{s} f(s) \Pr(S = s)
\]  

(24.9)

Therefore, with a large sample,

\[
\Pr(Y = y|do(X = x)) \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Pr(Y = y|X = x, S = s_i)
\]  

(24.10)

and this will still be (approximately) true when we use a consistent estimate of the conditional probability, rather than its true value.

The same reasoning applies for estimating \( \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = x)] \). Moreover, we can use the same reasoning to avoid explicitly summing over all possible \( s \) if we do have \( \Pr(S) \), by simulating from it\(^1\). Even if our sample (or simulation) is not completely IID, but is statistically stationary, in the sense we will cover in Chapter 26 (strictly speaking: “ergodic”), then we can still use this trick.

None of this gets us away from having to estimate \( \Pr(Y|X, S) \), which is still going to be a high-dimensional object, if \( S \) has many variables.

### 24.1.3 Propensity Scores

The problems of having to estimate high-dimensional conditional distributions and of averaging over large sets of control values are both reduced if the set of control variables has in fact only a few dimensions. If we have two sets of control variables, \( S \) and \( R \), both of which satisfy the back-door criterion for identifying \( \Pr(Y|do(X = x)) \), all else being equal we should use \( R \) if it contains fewer variables than \( S \)\(^2\).

An important special instance of this is when we can set \( R = f(S) \), for some function \( f \), and have

\( X \indep S|R \)  

(24.11)

In the jargon, \( R \) is a sufficient statistic\(^3\) for predicting \( X \) from \( S \). To see why this matters, suppose now that we try to identify \( \Pr(Y = y|do(X = x)) \) from a back-door

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\(^1\)This is a “Monte Carlo” approximation to the full expectation value.

\(^2\)Other things which might not be equal: the completeness of data on \( R \) and \( S \); parametric assumptions might be more plausible for the variables in \( S \), giving a better rate of convergence; we might be more confident that \( S \) really does satisfy the back-door criterion.

\(^3\)This is not the same sense of the word “sufficient” as in “causal sufficiency”.
adjustment for $R$ alone, not for $S$. We have\footnote{Going from Eq. 24.13 to Eq. 24.14 uses the fact that $R = f(S)$, so conditioning on both $R$ and $S$ is the same as just conditioning on $S$. Going from Eq. 24.14 uses the fact that $S \perp X | R$.}

$$
\begin{align*}
\sum_r \Pr(Y = y | X = x, R = r) \Pr(R = r) &= \sum_{r,s} \Pr(Y = y, S = s | X = x, R = r) \Pr(R = r) \\
&= \sum_{r,s} \Pr(Y = y | X = x, R = r, S = s) \Pr(S = s | X = x, R = r) \Pr(R = r) \\
&= \sum_{r,s} \Pr(Y = y | X = x, S = s) \Pr(S = s | X = x, R = r) \Pr(R = r) \\
&= \sum_{r,s} \Pr(Y = y | X = x, S = s) \sum_r \Pr(S = s, R = r) \\
&= \sum_s \Pr(Y = y | X = x, S = s) \Pr(S = s) \\
&= \Pr(Y = y | do(X = x))
\end{align*}
$$

That is to say, if $S$ satisfies the back-door criterion, then so does $R$. Since $R$ is a function of $S$, both the computational and the statistical problems which come from using $R$ are no worse than those of using $S$, and possibly much better, if $R$ has much lower dimension.

It may seem far-fetched that such a summary score should exist, but really all that’s required is that some combinations of the variables in $S$ carry the same information. Consider for instance, the set-up where

$$
\begin{align*}
X &\leftarrow \sum_{j=1}^p V_j + \epsilon_X \\
Y &\leftarrow f(X, V_1, V_2, \ldots V_p) + \epsilon_Y
\end{align*}
$$

To identify the effect of $X$ on $Y$, we need to block the back-door paths between them. Each one of the $V_j$ provides such a back-door path, so we need to condition on all of them. However, if $R = \sum_{j=1}^p V_j$, then $X \perp \{V_1, V_2, \ldots V_p\} | R$, so we could reduce a $p$-dimensional set of control variables to a one-dimensional set.

Often, as here, finding summary scores will depend on the functional form, and so not be available in the general, non-parametric case. There is, however, an important special case where, if we can use the back-door criterion at all, we can use a one-dimensional summary.

This is the case where $X$ is binary. If we set $f(S) = \Pr(X = 1 | S = s)$, and then take this as our summary $R$, it is not hard to convince oneself that $X \perp S | R$. This $f(S)$ is called the propensity score. It is remarkable, and remarkably convenient, that an arbitrarily large set of control variables $S$, perhaps with very complicated...
relationships with \( X \) and \( Y \), can always be boiled down to a single number between 0 and 1, but there it is.

That said, except in very special circumstances, there is no analytical formula for \( f(S) \). This means that it must be modeled and estimated. The most common model seems to be logistic regression, but so far as I can see this is just because many people know no other way to model a binary variable. Since accurate propensity scores are needed to make the method work, it would seem to be worthwhile to model \( R \) very carefully, and to consider GAM or fully non-parametric estimates.

### 24.1.4 Matching and Propensity Scores

Suppose that our causal variable of interest \( X \) is binary, or (almost equivalent) that we are only interested in comparing the effect of two levels, \( do(X = 1) \) and \( do(X = 0) \). Let’s call these the “treatment” and “control” groups for definiteness, though nothing really hinges on one of them being in any sense a normal or default value (as “control” suggests) — for instance, we might want to know not just whether men get paid more than women, but whether they are paid more because of their sex\(^5\). In situations like this, we are often not so interested in the full distributions \( \Pr(Y|do(X = 1)) \) and \( \Pr(Y|do(X = 0)) \), but just in the expectations, \( \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 1)] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 0)] \).

In fact, we are often interested just in the difference between these expectations, \( \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 1)] - \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 0)] \).

Suppose we are the happy possessors of a set of control variables \( S \) which satisfy the back-door criterion. How might we use them to estimate this average causal effect?

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 1)] - \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 0)] &= \sum_s \Pr(S = s) \mathbb{E}[Y|X = 1, S = s] - \sum_s \Pr(S = s) \mathbb{E}[Y|X = 0, S = s] \\
&= \sum_s \Pr(S = s) \left( \mathbb{E}[Y|X = 1, S = s] - \mathbb{E}[Y|X = 0, S = s] \right)
\end{align*}
\]

Clearly, we need to estimate \( \mathbb{E}[Y|X = 1, S = s] - \mathbb{E}[Y|X = 0, S = s] \). The simplest way to do this would be to find all the individuals in the sample with \( S = s \), and

\(^5\) The example is both imperfect and controversial. It is imperfect because biological sex (never mind cultural gender) is not quite binary, even in mammals, but it’s close enough for a good approximation. It is controversial because many statisticians insist that there is no sense in talking about causal effects unless there is some actual manipulation or intervention one could do to change \( X \) for an actually-existing “unit” — see, for instance, Holland (1986), which seems to be the source of the slogan “No causation without manipulation”. I will just note that (i) this is the kind of metaphysical argument which statisticians usually avoid (if we can’t talk about sex or race as causes, because changing those makes the subject a “different person”, how about native language? the shape of the nose? hair color? whether they go to college?); (ii) genetic variables are highly manipulable with modern experimental techniques, though we don’t use them on people; (iii) real scientists routinely talk about causal effects with no feasible manipulation (e.g., “continental drift causes earthquakes”), or even imaginable manipulation (e.g., “the solar system formed because of gravitational attraction”); and, finally (iv) many of the statisticians who make such pronouncements work or have worked for the Educational Testing Service, and so have a vested interest in being able to testify in court that, strictly speaking, sex and race cannot have any causal role in the score anyone gets on the SAT. Whether their views are the cause or the effect of their employment, I am not able to say. (Points (i)-(ii) follow Glymour (1986), but he was too polite to mention (iv).)
24.1. ESTIMATORS IN THE BACK- AND FRONT- DOOR CRITERIA

compare the mean $Y$ for those who are treated ($X = 1$) to the mean $Y$ for those who are untreated ($X = 0$). This is a sort of a paired comparison, which is called “matching”, because members of the treatment group are being compared to with members of the control group with matching values of the covariates $S$.

If the number of covariates in $S$ is large, the curse of dimensionality settles upon us. Many values of $S$ will have few or no individuals at all, let alone a large number in both the treatment and the control groups. Even if the real difference $E[Y|X = 1, S = s] - E[Y|X = 0, S = s]$ is small, with only a few individuals in either sub-group we could easily get a large difference in sample means. And of course with continuous covariates in $S$, each individual will generally have no exact matches at all.

The very clever idea of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is to solve this by matching not on $S$, but on the propensity score defined in the last section. We have seen already that when $X$ is binary, adjusting for the propensity score is just as good as adjusting for the full set of covariates $S$. It is easy to double-check (Exercise 2) that

$$
\sum_s \Pr(S = s) (E[Y|X = 1, S = s] - E[Y|X = 0, S = s]) = \sum_r \Pr(R = r) (E[Y|X = 1, R = r] - E[Y|X = 0, R = r])
$$

(24.23)

when $R = \Pr(X = 1|S = s)$, so we lose no essential information by matching on the propensity score $R$ rather than on the covariates $S$. Intuitively, we now compare each treated individual with one who was just as likely to have received the treatment, but, by chance, did not. On average, the differences between such matched individuals have to be due to the treatment.

What have we gained by doing this? Since $R$ is always a one-dimensional variable, no matter how big $S$ is, it is going to be much easier to find matches on $R$ than on $S$—the curse of dimensionality has been broken. This is a tremendous advantage, which makes matching actually feasible.

It is important to be clear, however, that the gain here is in computational tractability and statistical efficiency, not in fundamental identification. With $R = \Pr(X = 1|S = s)$, it will always be true that $X \perp S|R$, whether or not the back-door criterion is satisfied. If the criterion is satisfied, in principle there is nothing stopping us from using matching on $S$ to estimate the effect, except our own impatience. If the criterion is not satisfied, having a compact one-dimensional summary of the wrong set of control variables is just going to let us get the wrong answer faster.

Some confusion seems to have arisen on this point, because, conditional on the propensity score, the treated group and the control group have the same distribution of covariates. (Again, recall that $X \perp S|R$.) Since treatment and control groups have the same distribution of covariates in a randomized experiment, some people have concluded that propensity score matching is just as good as randomization. That this is emphatically not the case.

\footnote{If no exact match is available, we might match to within some distance, or do some sort of kernel-weighted matching. (It’s not a good idea to use these directly on $S$, because they become very inefficient in high dimensions.) See, e.g., Stuart (2010) for details.}

\footnote{These people do not include Rubin and Rosenbaum, but it is easy to see how their readers could come away with this impression. See Pearl (2009b, §11.3.5), and especially Pearl (2009a).}
The propensity score matching method has become incredibly popular since Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and there are a huge number of implementations of various versions of it. The MatchIt package in R is one of the most common, but see Stuart (2010) for a fairly recent listing of relevant software in R and other languages.

24.2 Instrumental-Variables Estimates

§23.3.3 introduced the idea of using instrumental variables to identify causal effects. Roughly speaking, \( I \) is an instrument for identifying the effect of \( X \) on \( Y \) when \( I \) is a cause of \( X \), but the only way \( I \) is associated with \( Y \) is through directed paths which go through \( X \). To the extent that variation in \( I \) predicts variation in \( X \) and \( Y \), this can only be because \( X \) has a causal influence on \( Y \). More precisely, given some controls \( S \), \( I \) is a valid instrument when \( I \perp Y \mid S \), and every path from \( I \) to \( Y \) left open by \( S \) has an arrow into \( X \).

In the simplest case, of Figure 23.7, we saw that when everything is linear, we can find the causal coefficient of \( Y \) on \( X \) as

\[
\beta = \frac{\text{Cov}(I, Y)}{\text{Cov}(I, X)}
\]

(24.24)

A one-unit change in \( I \) causes (on average) an \( \alpha \)-unit change in \( X \), and an \( \alpha \beta \)-unit change in \( Y \), so \( \beta \) is, as it were, the gearing ratio or leverage of the mechanism connecting \( I \) to \( Y \).

Estimating \( \beta \) by plugging in the sample values of the covariances into Eq. 24.24 is called the Wald estimator of \( \beta \). In more complex situations, we might have multiple instruments, and be interested in the causal effects of multiple variables, and we might have to control for some covariates to block undesired paths and get valid instruments. In such situations, the Wald estimator breaks down.

There is however a more general procedure which still works, provided the linearity assumption holds. This is called two-stage regression, or two-stage least squares (2SLS).

1. Regress \( X \) on \( I \) and \( S \). Call the fitted values \( \hat{x} \).
2. Regress \( Y \) on \( \hat{x} \) and \( S \), but not on \( I \). The coefficient of \( Y \) on \( \hat{x} \) is a consistent estimate of \( \beta \).

The logic is very much as in the Wald estimator: conditional on \( S \), variations in \( I \) are independent of the rest of the system. The only way they can affect \( Y \) is through their effect on \( X \). In the first stage, then, we see how much changes in the instruments affect \( X \). In the second stage, we see how much these \( I \)-caused changes in \( X \) change \( Y \); and this gives us what we want.

To actually prove that this works, we would need to go through some heroic linear algebra to show that the population version of the two-stage estimator is actually equal to \( \beta \), and then a straightforward argument that plugging in the appropriate sample covariance matrices is consistent. The details can be found in any econometrics textbook, so I’ll skip them. (But see Exercise 3.)
24.3. Uncertainty and Inference

As mentioned in §24.2, there are circumstances where it is possible to use instrumental variables in nonlinear and even nonparametric models. The technique becomes far more complicated, however, because finding $\Pr(Y = y|do(X = x))$ requires solving Eq. 23.15,

$$\Pr(Y|do(I = i)) = \sum_x \Pr(Y|do(X = x))\Pr(X = x|do(I = i))$$

and likewise finding $E[Y|do(X = x)]$ means solving

$$E[Y|do(I = i)] = \sum_x E[Y|do(X = x)]\Pr(X = x|do(I = i))$$  \hspace{1cm} (24.25)

When, as is generally the case, $x$ is continuous, we have rather an integral equation,

$$E[Y|do(I = i)] = \int E[Y|do(X = x)]p(x|do(I = i))dx$$  \hspace{1cm} (24.26)

Solving such integral equations is not (in general) impossible, but it is hard, and the techniques needed are much more complicated than even two-stage least squares. I will not go over them here, but see Li and Racine (2007, chs. 16–17).

### 24.3 Uncertainty and Inference

The point of the identification strategies from Chapter 23 is to reduce the problem of causal inference to that of ordinary statistical inference. Having done so, we can assess our uncertainty about any of our estimates of causal effects the same way we would assess any other statistical inference. If we want confidence intervals or standard errors for $E[Y|do(X = 1)] - E[Y|do(X = 0)]$, for instance, we can treat our estimate of this like any other point estimate, and proceed accordingly. In particular, we can use the bootstrap (Chapter 6), if analytical formulas are not available or unappealing.

The one wrinkle to the use of analytical formulas comes from two-stage least-squares. Taking standard errors, confidence intervals, etc., for $\beta$ from the usual formulas for the second regression neglects the fact that this estimate of $\beta$ comes from regressing $Y$ on \(\hat{x}\), which is itself an estimate and so uncertain.

### 24.4 Recommendations

Instrumental variables are a very clever idea, but they need to be treated with caution. They only work if the instruments are valid, and that validity is rests just as much on assumptions about the underlying DAG as any of the other identification strategies. The crucial point, after all, is that the instrument is an indirect cause of $Y$, but only through $X$, with no other (unblocked) paths connecting $I$ to $Y$. This can only too easily fail, if some indirect path has been neglected.

Matching, especially propensity score matching, is just as ingenious, and just as much at the mercy of the correctness of the DAG. Whether we match directly on
covariates, or indirectly through the propensity score, what matters is whether the
covariates really block off the back-door pathways between $X$ and $Y$. If they do, well
and good. If they do not, then ingenuity is not going to help you.

There is a curious divide, among practitioners, between those who lean mostly
on instrumental variables, and those who lean mostly on matching. The former
tend to suspect that (in our terms) the covariates used in matching are not enough
to block all the back-door paths, and to think that the business is more or less over
once an exogenous variable has been found. The matchers, for their part, think
the instrumentalists are too quick to discount the possibility that their instruments are
connected to $Y$ through unmeasured pathways, but that if you match on enough
variables, you’ve got to block the back-door paths. (They don’t often worry that
they might be conditioning on colliders in doing so.) As is often the case in the
sciences, there is much truth to each faction’s criticism of the other side. You are now
in a position to think more clearly, and act more intelligently, in these matters than
many practitioners.

Throughout these chapters, we have been assuming that we know the correct
DAG. Without such assumptions, or ones equivalent to them, none of these ideas can
be used. In the next chapter, then, we will look at how to actually begin discovering
causal structure from data.

24.5 Exercises

1. Prove Eq. 24.23.

2. Suppose that $X$ has three levels, say 0, 1, 2. Let $R$ be the vector $(\Pr(X = 0|S = s), \Pr(X = 1|S = s))$.
   Prove that $X \perp S|R$. (This is how to generalize propensity scores to non-binary
   $X$.)

3. For the situation in Figure 23.7, prove that the two-stage least-squares estimate
   of $\beta$ is the same as the Wald estimate.

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As an example for their side, Areceneaux et al. (2010) applied matching methods to an actual ex-
periment, where the real causal relations could be worked out straightforwardly for comparison. Well-
conducted propensity-score “matching suggests that a pre-election phone call that encouraged people to
wear their seat belts also generated huge increases in voter turnout”. Their paper provides a convincing
explanation of where this illusory effect comes from, i.e., of what the unblocked back-door path is, which
I will not spoil for you.

For instance, a recent and widely-promoted preprint by three economists argued that watching tele-
vision caused autism in children. (I leave tracking down the paper as an exercise for the reader.) The
economists used the variation in how much it rains across different locations in California, Oregon and
Washington as an instrument to predict average TV-watching ($X$) and its affects on the prevalence of
autism ($Y$). It is certainly plausible that kids watch more TV when it rains, and that neither TV-watching
nor autism causes rain. But this leaves open the question of whether rain and the prevalence of autism
might not have some common cause, and for the West Coast in particular it is easy to find one. It is
well-established that the risk of autism is higher among children of older parents, and that more-educated
people tend to have children later in life. All three states have, of course, a striking contrast between large,
rainy cities full of educated people (San Francisco, Portland, Seattle), and very dry, very rural locations
on the other side of the mountains. Thus there is a (potential) uncontrolled common cause of rain and
autism, namely geographic location. — For a rather more convincing effort to apply ideas about causal
inference to understanding the prevalence of autism, see Liu et al. (2010).